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The Navy needs small, lethal, fast, green-water ships and submarines to 
take the fight to the enemy in the littorals. The Mark VI patrol boat (top) and 
this HOSS X-1 concept submarine (designed by and copyright J. Scott 
Shipman of B.B. Hoss, Inc.) are examples of vessels recommended by the 
New Navy Fighting Machine Study.  
A decade ago the New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) Study was conducted 
by the Naval Postgraduate School for the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) Office of Net Assessment.[1] The study’s goal of designing and 
justifying a fleet of interlocking components was inspired by Rear Admiral 
Bradley A. Fiske, who entitled his best book The Navy as a Fighting 
Machine.[2] Fiske meant a fleet must operate like a machine complete in all its 
moving parts to function for its designed purpose. 
The New Navy Fighting Machine Study described an affordable yet more 
numerous and complete U. S. fleet for the 21st century. By distinguishing 
smaller, single-purpose, green-water (coastal and littoral) combatants from the 
large, multipurpose, expensive, heavily manned blue-water (open-ocean) 
fleet, the study was able to restore a Navy of more than 600 vessels that 
could be sustained with an annual Ship Construction New (SCN) budget of 
$15 billion.[3] The fleet’s composition was tested by war games and studies 
conducted by faculty and students. Their efforts explored the value and 
limitations of the NNFM force against two first-class enemies, irregular warfare 
opponents, and for peacetime engagement with friendly states. 
The redesigned fleet’s greater offensive capabilities, greater resilience in 
contested environments, and adaptability across a range of possible futures 
were evident. For offshore combat in dangerous waters, the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Total Ship System Engineering students designed a 
new “Minuteman”class of missile combatants to comply with surface navy 
specifications that included eight antiship cruise missiles, a gun, a combat 
crew of 12, bunks for 30, and a cruising radius of 3,000 nm. New command, 
control, and communications methods to support a more numerous and 
distributed green-water fleet were developed and tested in live experiments. 
Applications of a temporal mesh network with almost undetectable signals—
under the rubric of “network optional warfare”—were shown to be vital in 
contested environments. 
Several student theses explored the composition and individual ship designs 
in detail. A thesis by Navy Lieutenant Juan Carrasco examined in detail the 
manpower required for the NNFM’s 600 ships. He showed they took fewer 
billets than the then-existing 280 ship Navy. Carrasco also discovered the 
sobering fact that in the existing 280-ship fleet its 11 nuclear-powered aircraft 
carriers (CVNs) took 46 percent of sea-going billets. By reducing the number 
of CVNs to six or seven and distributing the sea-based air capability more 
widely, the NNFM freed enough people to operate the new fighting fleet. 
Another thesis was by Blue Angel pilot Lieutenant Frank Weisser, who 
collaborated on the design of a light aircraft carrier (CVL), displacing 28,000 
tons, that could carry 20 F-35B aircraft plus assorted helicopters and 
unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) for scouting and auxiliary functions. Weisser 
showed that in most scenarios two or three CVLs working together, or one 
operating in concert with a CVN, would be more adaptable and could deliver 
firepower more efficiently than sea-based air power operating from CVNs 
alone. 
The NNFM Study defined a sustainable steady-state endpoint, but made clear 
that no fleet design could be final. Its composition must evolve because the 
needs, budgets, and designs would change in response to new geopolitical 
and technological conditions, including unpredictable ones that would unfold 
during the rest of the 21st Century. It is evident the study’s original 
composition and distribution of funds must change. It had allocated 10 percent 
of the presumed annual SCN budget of $15B to strategic deterrence (ballistic 
missile submarines [SSBNs] and ballistic missile defense [BMD] ships) so that 
the next generation should not consist solely of the most exquisite and 
expensive ships that money could buy. That point of view has not been 
accepted. The impending commitment to the Columbia-class SSBN 
construction is estimated to be between $5.3B and $6.5B per year while its 
15-year-long replacement program is being executed.[4] Consequently a 
reasonable upper limit of SCN to sustain the future green- and blue-water 
components cannot exceed about $12B. Taking into account cost growth as 
well, the revised green-water component of 394 vessels will take not 10 
percent but closer to 15 percent of annual SCN. The size of the blue-water 
fleet probably will need to diminish for the same reasons. 
The 2009 study has had little effect on U. S. fleet composition. The Navy 
continues to buy CVNs, although the numbers have shrunk from 15 to 10 or 
11; nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) continue to be a vital 
component, but SSN numbers have shrunk from over 90 to about 40; and the 
SCN budget is hard put to maintain 30 large amphibious assault ships, and 
while the surface fleet is growing the number of guided-missile destroyers 
(DDGs), the service life of the Aegis cruisers (CGs) is coming to an end with 
no replacement being built. Moreover, there is not yet a dedicated Navy 
component designed to take the offensive in dangerous littoral waters 
Changes that ought to transpire in the blue-water fleet’s composition can be 
addressed another day. This is devoted to updating the green-water fleet. 
(See Table 1 for types, numbers, and costs.) It includes 16 non-nuclear 
submarines because littoral waters are where they will be most effective. 
Table 1 does not include unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles, the 
development of which has lagged unmanned aerial vehicles, but they must be 
added as their missions and tactics are developed and tested. Changes from 
the original study are not included because its distribution is controlled by the 
sponsor, the Office of Net Assessment. Its 60 pages of “rationale” and 
“justification” for the 21st-century fleet’s composition are still sturdy, however, 
and have stood the test of time. 
 
The NNFM study highlighted the need for a “czar” empowered to experiment 
and develop the technologies, tactics, and operations to fight in contested 
littoral waters.[5] A 20th-century model for such a czar is Rear Admiral William 
A. Moffett who hastened the development of naval aviation. Though not an 
aviator, he was assigned as the first chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics in 
1921. This was at a time when the Navy and Marine Corps did not know what 
its eventual composition ought to be, but they wanted to resist the 
exaggerated claims of Army Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, who asserted a 
single air force would be best.[6] Moffett had a relatively large budget at a time 
when naval arms treaties were in effect and Navy funds were severely 
constrained. He was given the money to build and man the carriers 
USS Langley (CV-1), Lexington (CV-2), Saratoga (CV-3), and Ranger (CV-4) 
and to cover their decks with large numbers of aircraft. He also developed 
seaplanes and amphibians for scouting and was a champion of dirigibles. 
Moffett and the Navy had the simplifying advantage of preparing for one 
predictable enemy, the Japanese fleet. 
The best 21st-century exemplar is Admiral William McRaven when he led the 
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCom). McRaven had his own budget 
to cover SOCom’s many operations worldwide. In today’s Navy, the 
equivalent of Moffett and McRaven would be an admiral empowered to 
develop all aspects of green-water technologies, operations, tactics, and 
logistics. The budget and manpower numbers would be a smaller proportion 
of the Navy budget than Moffett’s, while his responsibilities would be broader, 
more like McRaven’s in scope. 
Here is an outline of a littoral warfare czar’s breadth of responsibilities, largely 
taken from the NNFM study’s description of the ways the green-water fleet 
would achieve success by emphasizing offensive maritime capabilities suited 
to keep the peace or fight in wartime. The potentially contested waters in 
which the 21st-century Navy must influence prospective enemies are 
widespread: Baltic, Aegean, and Eastern Mediterranean Seas, the Black Sea, 
Persian Gulf, South and East China seas, and Yellow Sea are vital today, and 
other littoral regions may become important in the future. In addition to its 
responsibility to confront and contain large states, the green-water fleet also 
will have the ships and workforce best suited to contain pirates, drug runners, 
and human traffickers in regions like the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and 
off the Horn of Africa. To the extent that peacetime engagement with the 
nations of the world is restored as a national imperative, the smaller-sized 
ships of the green-water fleet would be well suited to conduct port calls, 
collaborative exercises, and other forms of friendly presence.[7] 
The NNFM Study concluded that a new command was the best, perhaps the 
only, way to achieve a green-water navy intended to fight in dangerous, 
confined waters. The next best solution would be to assign responsibility to 
the Commander, Naval Surface Forces. Until he retired, then-Vice Admiral 
Tom Rowden was developing a “distributed lethality” concept for the surface 
navy that included ships intended for sea denial that would conduct offensive 
operations in littoral waters. Whatever the plan and whoever has the authority 
to develop it, about 15 percent of SCN funds should go to a green-water 
component to complement the blue-water forces that are saddled with the 
task of maintaining world-wide sea control. The green-water navy’s primary 
function of sea denial should be carried out by highly distributable, hard-to-
find, single-purpose vessels designed to keep an enemy on the defensive in 
cluttered, confined waters, and fight at relatively short range. 
 The green-water fleet is also suited for irregular warfare and can conduct 
open-ocean patrols when the Coast Guard is overtasked with homeland 
protection. It is highly effective for peacetime engagement with friendly states. 
And a fourth role for components of the green-water fleet would be to 
cooperate with the blue-water fleet in any major future campaign. 
To be viable in the face of Russian, Chinese, and other nations’ 
antiaccess/area denial threats, the U.S. Navy must develop an offensively 
disposed, highly distributable, forward-based, numerically significant fleet 
component that can be put at risk and fight in dangerous littoral waters. This 
green-water fleet proposal would enable the Navy to do all that on a budget 
that the nation can afford. 
[1] They included experts on China, ship construction, Navy budgets 
(including SCN), extended campaigns in the Aegean and Gulf of Aden, carrier 
operations in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, and a retired Air Force general. 
[2] Bradley Fiske was one of the Navy’s most innovative officers. In 1916, he 
wrote his forward-looking book, The Navy as a Fighting Machine. It has been 
republished in the Naval Institute’s Classics of Sea Power Series. 
[3] An SCN of $15B/year seems an upper limit to a sustainable budget for ship 
procurement. Admiral Mike Mullen as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
when asked what kept him up nights replied: “The budget deficit and the 
growing national debt.” 
[4] See Congressional Research Service Report R41129, 28 March 2018. 
[5] Littoral waters are “where the clutter is.” Clutter comprises shallow water, 
shoals, islands, fiords, oil rigs, coastal traders, fishing boats, commercial 
aircraft, and many electronic transmissions. 
[6] Then-Captain Bradley Fiske was so impressed with the potential of naval 
aviation that he designed and patented an aerial torpedo before aircraft 
engines were powerful enough to lift the torpedo in the air. 
[7] An essay by then-Commander Stephen Benson U.S. Navy (Retired), 
entitled “Formative and Operative Engagement” called this mode of friendly 
presence “formative engagement.” 
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